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CABLE TELEVISION'S JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTE
Sheila Mahony*
It is claimed by representatives of the cable television industry and some
of the industry's regulators that cable television is, or may be in the future,
subjected to over-regulation by zealous municipal and state officials, and that
there ought be only one nonfederal level of regulation. This article will
examine the legality, and particularly the constitutionality, of the proposals to
deal with the "problem" of three-tier regulation; it will not examine the
merits of those proposals. Such examinations are better made by economists,
political scientists and policy analysts of disciplines other than the law.
A good deal of the current thinking concerning the problem of three-tier
cable television regulation envisages federal authorities controlling certain
features of cable systems (for example, signal carriage), excluding all nonfederal involvement, while a single nonfederal authority would regulate other
enumerated interests (for example, franchisee selection) under a program
dictated either by Congress or by the FCC upon explicit congressional
directives. The primary objectives of a cooperative regulatory program of
this sort are clarification of uncertain jurisdictional boundaries and elimination of burdensome and misguided state and local regulation.
It is the thesis of this article that neither the FCC nor Congress has the
authority to specify how a power inherent in the state is to be exercised, nor
the authority to designate the locus of such power, and that neither the FCC
nor Congress has the power to confer such power upon a nonfederal level of
government. Additionally, the cooperative regulatory programs which Congress has enacted in other areas afford no precedent for such a program for
cable television and, indeed, are demonstrably ill-suited to cable television at
this time.
I.

ORIGINS OF THE THREE-TIER PROBLEM

An examination of the three-tier problem requires consideration of the
legal arrangements which prevailed in cable's early days. From the onset, a
crucial step in the establishment of a cable system has been to obtain a
*
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franchise from the local government of the area in which the system was to
be built. Undoubtedly, some entrepreneurs simply strung their wires without
any legal authorization, but such cases were not the rule. The prevailing
practice has been to obtain local permission in the form of a franchise to use
the streets.
As an increasing number of localities were approached for franchises,
sophistication in dealing with cable entrepreneurs grew. This greater sophistication eventually took two forms. One was a heightened awareness of the
franchising authority's responsibility to its citizens in conferring monopoly
rights, which led to franchise provisions placing a limit on the duration of the
grant, controlling rates, and imposing service obligations. The other was a
heightened awareness of the local official's opportunity for corrupt personal
gain. Occurrences of bribery and extortion spread. In the most celebrated
case, the former chairman of the industry's trade association was convicted
of bribery.' Whether such corruption was rife within the industry or whether
the instances which came to light were rare is not relevant here. The
important point is that it became a common assumption that corruption of
and by local officials was widespread. That assumption significantly altered
the governmental response to cable.
Bribery charges were closely followed by a surge of activity at the state
level. 2 Although the creation of state cable commissions was rarely accompanied by formal statements that suspicion of local corruption was a reason
for their existence, in retrospect it is an inescapable conclusion that the two
were associated. To be sure, there were other factors which prompted this
state action. In some states, a different sophistication--concern over the
consequences of spawning monopolies with little or no check in the local
franchises upon their power to abuse their monopoly status-was also a
factor in the deliberations of the state legislatures. Also, it should not be
forgotten that the state commissions were legislated into existence during the
"blue sky era", when the hopes and dreams about the promise of this new
technology were being fed by the industry, foundation executives, and the
academic community. There was also a popular view that the public sector
had been short-changed in the allocation of broadcast frequencies and that
1. United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982
(1973).
2. This article is not directed at those situations in which the state agencies alone
franchise and regulate cable television, with no local authority established to award
franchises (Nevada, Connecticut, Alaska, Vermont, Rhode Island, and Hawaii). In such
cases, there is, of course, only two-tier regulation. Rather, the discussion focuses upon
the states which created a third regulatory tier, such as Massachusetts, New York, New
Jersey, Minnesota, and Delaware. The leaders were Massachusetts and New York, which
created their commissions in 1971 and 1972 respectively.
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regulation of the television industry somehow had been inadequate. Thus,
the instinct was to create a state role early in the development of the cable
industry in the hope that abuses would be foreclosed before they could
become entrenched.
The federal government's role grew during this period as well. The FCC
proceeded from an expression of "doubtful" authority to regulate cable
systems in 1958, 3 to a denial of common carrier microwave service to
transmit signals to a cable system on a theory of preventing adverse impact
upon a television station in 1962, 4 to the promulgation of program exclusivity rules and carriage requirements in 19655 and 1966,6 to the implementation of a "freeze" on the importation of any new distant signals into the top
100 television markets in 1968, to the adoption of comprehensive regulations in 19728 and piecemeal amendments since thenY In the course of this
evolution, the Commission in 1969 required cable systems with 3,500 or
more subscribers to originate programming,' 0 shortly thereafter instituted a

procedure for waiving the requirement, 1 ' and later suspended the requirement 12 by following the Eighth Circuit's determination that the Commission
had no authority to impose it." a The Commission continued the suspension
in effect following the Supreme Court's reversal of the Eighth Circuit's
decision' 4 because of uncertainty as to the wisdom of the rule, 15 and
3. Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Laramie Community TV Co., 24 F.C.C. 251, 255
(1958).
4. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962), aff'd, 321 F.2d 359
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
5. First Report and Order on Microwave-Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965);
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Business Radio Service, 1 F.C.C.2d 524 (1965).
These rules applied to microwave-fed cable systems.
6. Cable systems not fed by microwave were subjected to such rules by the Second
Report and Order on CATV, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966), 47 C.F.R. §§ 74.1101-09 (1970)
(now 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.51, 76.91 (1974)).

7. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry on CATV Technology, 15
F.C.C.2d 417 (1968).
8. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 141 (1972).
9. See, e.g., Reconsideration of Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 326
(1972); Clarification of Cable Television Rules, 46 F.C.C.2d 175 (1974).
10. First Report and Order on CATV Rules, 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969) (effective Jan.
1, 1971), rules set aside, Midwest Video Corp. v. United States, 441 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir.
1971), rev'd, 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
11. Memorandum Opinion and Order on CATV, 27 F.C.C.2d 778 (1971).
12. 36 Fed. Reg. 10876 (1971).
13. Midwest Video Corp. v. United States, 441 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 406

U.S. 649 (1972).
14. United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
15. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Inquiry, 46 F.C.C.2d 139 (1974);
Report and Order on Cable Television Service, 49 F.C.C.2d 1090, 1091 (1974).
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ultimately abandoned the rule in its entirety in 197416 -all in the course of
five years. Against this background of hesitation, uncertainty and reversal,
the FCC instituted a proceeding to deal with the problem of three-tier
regulation which in its estimation, is counterproductive, causes delays, and is
17
imprecise, unclear, and obstructive.
II.

PROPOSALS TO RECTIFY THE PROBLEM

The first official recognition that a problem involving intergovernmental
relations in cable television regulation might arise occurred in 1970 when the
FCC observed that "actions have been taken in the cable field without any
overall plan as to the Federal-local relationship."' 8 The Commission then
outlined three possible approaches: "federal licensing of cable systems,
maintenance of its existing regulatory program, and [f]ederal regulation of
some aspects, with local regulation of others under federal prescription of
standards for local [jurisdictions]."' 19 The FCC opted for the last approach.
In its 1972 Cable Television Report and Order,20 the Commission took the
position that a comprehensive licensing system would be overly burdensome.
Because of the local jurisdictions' involvement in the provision of cable to
their residents, the Commission decided upon a plan for "deliberately
structured dualism" ,which would encompass minimum criteria 'for franchises
with enforcement at the federal level in the certifying process. 21 In addition,
however, it indicated some concern about how its plan for "deliberately
structured dualism" would work out in practice, and voiced the intention of
seeking the advice of a special committee composed of representatives of a
number of interested groups in order to determine the proper allocation of
regulatory responsibility. 22 Thus the Federal-State/Local Advisory Committee (FSLAC) was created to advise the Commission on the question of the
proper allocation of regulatory jurisdiction among the three levels of government.
The Steering Committee's report (FSLAC Report) was issued in September 1973.23 The Steering Committee was in unanimous agreement that
16. See Report and Order on Cable Television Service, 49 F.C.C.2d 1090, 1108-09
(1974).
17. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Inquiry, 49 F.C.C.2d 1199 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Notice and Inquiry].

18. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for CATV, 25 F.C.C.2d 50, 51 (1970).
19. Id. at 52.
20. 36 F.C.C.2d 141 (1972).
21. Id. at 207.
22. id. at 210.
23. The Final Report of the Steering Committee of the FCC Cable Television
Advisory Committee on Federal/State-Local Regulatory Relationships is available for
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duplicative regulation was undesirable. But the unanimity ended there. The
Steering Committee was divided into two camps as to how or whether the
objective of nonduplication could be achieved. The majority position was
that the Commission ought to permit no more than one nonfederal regulatory
partner, accomplishing this by "redelegating" 24 certain "local" functions to
the most local level of government and giving states a reasonable period of
time within which to adopt state legislation implementing this plan, after
which, in the absence of state action, the FCC should exercise exclusive
jurisdiction.25 The minority position was ,that while cities and states may
differ as to an appropriate allocation of nonfederal regulatory authority,
"they are competent to resolve those differences by themselves," 26 and that
there is no federal power, arising from the commerce clause, to limit or
27
control the intra-state allocation of regulatory jurisdiction.
A.

Commission Action

In response to the disparity of views within its advisory committee, the
Commission initiated a rulemaking proceeding. 28 It agreed with the FSLAC
that duplication should be avoided because of both the interference with fed29
eral objectives and the "possibility of obstruction of interstate commerce."
There is no doubt that excessive duplication of regulatory functions might
obstruct interstate commerce. The FCC objectives which might be frustrated
by duplication, however, were not enunciated. The Commission stated:
We are considering the adoption of any appropriate action or regulation that would prevent such an obstruction while at the same
time maintain the rightful prerogatives of the States (and localities as entities of the State) to adopt necessary regulations. Such
-regulations could, for instance, take the form of rules limiting
$8.75 from the National Technical Information Service at 5285 Port Royal Road,
Springfield, Virginia, 22151, Order No. PB 2230147 [hereinafter cited as FSLAC Report].

24. How the Steering Committee's majority conceived of a "redelegation" function
working was not made clear. The absence of any precedent whatever for such a
mechanism posed no obstacle to the majority. Nor did it cause the majority any apparent
concern that the Constitution does not countenance either delegations of functions by the
federal government to state or local governments or delegation from Congress to
administrative agencies or to any other body. The proposal, however, is obviously
unlawful. See note 49 & accompanying text infra.

25. See 1974 Notice and Inquiry, supra note 17, at 1201-03 for a further elaboration of the majority position.
26. FSLAC Report, supra note 23, at 83.
27. id. at 95.
28. 1974 Notice and Inquiry, supra note 17.
29. Id. at 1209.
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specific duplication of tasks such as certification, non-conforming
reporting forms, systems of accounts, etc. Alternatively, a program of cooperative review and approval of diverse non-federal
regulatory structures could suffice similar to the ones already in
place under the National Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 and the
Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970. "Joint Board" proposals
such as we already have with the State Regulatory Commissions
in the area of common carrier matters will also be considered.8 0
Thus, the Commission was considering the adoption of an explicitly
cooperative regulatory program which would delineate spheres of exclusive
authority. While the Commission sought comments regarding its authority to
regulate the type of nature of nonfederal regulatory programs, it did seem to
assume that such power exists. 3' That proceeding is now concluded, 32 with
no action having been taken. Although the Commission's decision concedes
that jurisdictional impediments exist, it terms them "not necessarily insur33
mountable.
The Commission's authority to regulate cable television systems is not
explicitly conferred by the Communications Act. In United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,3 4 the Supreme Court had its first occasion to rule on the
FCC's power over cable. It held cable systems to be engaged in interstate
commerce, 3 5 and it found that section 152(a) of the Communications Act,3 6
which makes the Act's provisions applicable to "all interstate . . communication by wire or radio," permitted the FCC to regulate cable television
systems. But the authority confirmed by that decision was "restricted to that
reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting."3 7 Thus,
Southwestern held that the FCC may impose restrictions upon cable systems
to the extent necessary to effectively carry out the FCC's explicit regulatory
responsibilities regarding broadcasting. The Commission's cable jurisdiction
was limited to that which was reasonably ancillary to its broadcast jurisdiction.
30. Id.
31. The power of Congress to authorize the FCC to take corrective action is
coextensive with its power to take corrective action itself and is discussed below in
connection with the discussion of the OTP bills under which Congress itself would act.
See pp. 881-82 in!ra.
32. Report and Order Terminating Proceeding in the Area of Duplicative and
Excessive Over-regulation of Cable TV, 49 Fed. Reg. 34608 (1975).
33. Id. at 34612.
34. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
35. Id. at 167-69.
36. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1970).
37. 392 U.S. at 178.
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The Commission's authority under Southwestern cannot reasonably be
argued to extend to restrictions on the type or nature of nonfederal cable
regulation. Were the FCC's jurisdiction over cable plenary, perhaps the
argument could successfully be made. Overlapping or even excessively
duplicative regulation of cable systems would have no bearing upon the
FCC's broadcast responsibilities. Absent an ancillary effect upon the Commission's broadcast responsibilities, Southwestern would not support an
assertion by the FCC of jurisdiction over nonfederal cable regulation.
Nor does the Supreme Court's second cable television decision, United
States v. Midwest Video Corp.,3 8 support the proposed FCC action. The
Court in Midwest Video narrowly upheld the FCC rule which requires cable
systems with 3,500 or more subscribers to originate programming. The
plurality opinion stated that the Southwestern rationale had not limited the
FCC to cable regulation designed only to prevent adverse competitive impact
upon television stations, stating: "the regulatory authority asserted by the
Commission in 1966 and generally sustained by this Court in Southwestern
was authority to regulate CATV with a view not merely to protect but to
promote the objectives for which the Commission had been assigned jurisdiction over broadcasting. 8' 9 The Court found that achievement of broadcasting regulation's long-established goals of "increasing the number of outlets
for community self-expression and augmenting the public's choice of programs and types of services" was furthered by the origination rule. 40 Thus
the rule was reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the
Commission's jurisdiction over broadcasting.
Midwest Video can fairly be said to have extended the Southwestern
rationale from one of jurisdiction intended to prevent cable systems from
doing harm to television stations, to one of jurisdiction intended to require
cable systems to promote legislative goals for television. It is difficult to
conceive how any action to restrict nonfederal regulation of cable systems
41
could fall within the rationale of Midwest Video.
It might be argued that the imposition of nonfederal requirements which
either cause duplication of effort by the cable system, mandate procedures
38. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
39. Id. at 667.
40. Id. at 668, quoting First Report and Order on CATV Rules, 20 F.C.C.2d 201,
202 (1969).
41. Although it is not discussed here in depth, the infirmity of the proposed
restriction on nonfederal regulation may be equally applicable to the current rules which
delineate certain provisions that must be included in local franchises if the cable system
is to receive a certificate of compliance. A certificate of compliance is required before a
cable system can "commence operations or add a television broadcast signal to existing
operations." 47 C.F.R. § 76.11 (1975).
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different from the FCC's for achieving the same or similar objectives, or
require the cable system to take action that federal authorities believe should
be taken at the initiative of the system alone, will impose costs on cable
systems which may leave them without sufficient resources to fulfill other
FCC requirements. The Commission has, in effect, embraced the argument
that the cost of nonfederal regulation may frustrate the achievement of
federal goals and in 1974, it stated its determination that "excessively
duplicative regulation does endanger the accomplishment of federal objectives." 42 This excessive cost argument, however, is broad enough to cover
many items in a cable system's budget which would not be influenced by
federal regulations. If the FCC has the authority to preclude cable systems
from adhering to a state commission's rule which the Commission concludes
is duplicative 43 on the ground that adherence would require expenditures
which would be more usefully spent in other ways, the same rationale would
justify a determination that travel and entertainment budgets could also frustrate the achievement of national goals and therefore serve as a predicate for
FCC intrusion into such matters. Clearly a theory so broad is untenable.
It is not here suggested that burdensome state regulation should be
tolerated. The point is that the FCC is not aggrieved by such regulation and
has no responsibility for challenging it. A cable system which is subjected to
burdensome state regulation has available to it a judicial challenge on the
ground that the regulation amounts to an undue burden on interstate
commerce. A number of courts have entertained similar allegations in
different contexts. 44 In each of these cases, a state or local regulation was
held to be an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, and in none of
them was it deemed necessary for a federal agency to involve itself in the
matter by taking action to limit the state or local action. Whether a particular
nonfederal regulation is burdensome is a question which may properly be
entertained by the courts and is an inappropriate subject for FCC comment.
The FCC may, if properly authorized, determine that particular subject
42. See 1974 Notice and Inquiry 1209.
43. The only way the Commission could possibly fashion a rule regarding nonfederal
regulation would be to preclude cable systems from honoring certain types of rules.
Certainly the Commission would not attempt to impose any rule directly on nonfederal
authorities, since it has no direct jurisdiction over them. Its jurisdiction to impose
requirements on cable systems is the only device available to accomplish a limitation on
nonfederal regulatory activity. Such a rule, therefore, must be in the form of a restriction
on cable systems performing certain activities.
44. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); The Minnesota
Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 396-97 (1913); Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95
U.S. 465 (1877); Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. City of Houston, 327 F. Supp. 910 (S.D. Tex.
1971); American Airlines v. Town of Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
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matters are of national interest and on that basis preempt nonfederal
regulation thereof. But short of preempting, it has no jurisdiction.
B. CongressionalAction
A more difficult question is what Congress can do with regard to the
problem of three-tier regulation. Since cable television systems are engaged
in interstate commerce, 45 they are an appropriate subject of congressional
action under the commerce clause. Congressional action may take the form
of direct regulation by Congress or delegation to the FCC of power to
regulate. However, Congress lacks authority to prescribe how the powers it
has not either assumed for itself or delegated to the FCC can be exercised by
state and local governments.
Of course, Congress may, pursuant to its commerce clause powers,
preempt nonfederal regulation by occupying the entire field, 40 by preempting only inconsistent nonfederal activity, 47 or by preempting and delegating
to the FCC plenary jurisdiction.4 8 However, Congress cannot delegate to the
states the power to regulate interstate commerce, and it obviously cannot
dictate how nonfederal authorities may achieve nonfederal goals, nor may it
dictate how nonfederal powers in achieving those goals may be allocated
between the states and their political subdivisions. 49 If the national interest
in cable television is such that Congress wishes to articulate a set of federal
goals for the medium as well as the means of enforcing them (such as
delegation to the FCC), it is the duty of Congress to articulate that authority,
formulate the national objectives and devise a federal enforcement mechanism. But it may not tell states how they must achieve objectives that
Congress does not declare to be national goals.
One might respond, however, that there are numerous precedents involving regulatory sharing between the federal government and states or cities or
both, and that cooperative regulatory schemes have been created and have
operated well in the past decade.50 Close examination of such cooperative
45. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 167-69 (1968).
46. E.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Boegli, 251 U.S. 315 (1920).
47. E.g., Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424, 430 (1963).

48. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); Federal
Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266 (1933).
49. Compare Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937), with In re
Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 560 (1891), and Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 317
(1851). See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964); Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).

50. Several important examples are the National Gas Pipeline Safety Act, the Federal
Railroad Safety Act, the Food Stamp Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act and
the 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, each of which is outlined and contrasted to
proposals for cooperative cable regulation in section IV infra.
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mechanisms, however, discloses that none of them presents a precedent for
congressional action that would allocate nonfederal regulatory powers regarding cable television. To evaluate this problem, it is first appropriate to
explore the concrete proposals for congressional action which have been put
forth by the White House Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP).
In January 1974, the President's Cabinet Committee on Cable Communications issued a report recommending, inter alia, "a carefully structured
dualism of governmental oversight." 51 OTP responded with two proposed
bills. The first (OTP I) appeared in April 1974.52 It provided that no
person could operate a cable system without a license from a cable licensing
agency having certain powers, among them the "sole and exclusive authority
over cable systems in the state, or political subdivision thereof, to enforce the
standards and requirements" of a section of the bill which set out a "cable
licensing program" to be followed by the nonfederal cable regulator. 53 In
other words, it mattered not whether a state or a city carried out the cable
licensing program, so long as only one of them did so within any particular
territory. This would have permitted a state to be the sole franchising (or
licensing) authority throughout a state, or would have allowed a state to stay
out of -the area completely, having delegated all such authority to its political
subdivisions. OTP I would also have permitted a state to decide to be the
licensing authority in all but its largest cities, but to delegate to such cities
authority to carry out the entire: licensing program. It would not have permitted cities to issue franchises while state commissions enforced cross-ownership restrictions or imposed interconnection requirements.
In response to comments and suggestions received on OTP I, OTP redrafted its legislative recommendations and proposed a new bill (OTP II) in
January 1975. It provides that a state or political subdivision "may adopt
[regulations] consistent with 'the exclusive grants of authority" contained in
the bill.5 4 It defines a "cable licensing authority" as "any state, county,
municipality or any political subdivision . . . that is empowered by law to
authorize by license, franchise, permit or other instrument of authority, the
construction and operation of a cable system within the jurisdiction of such
51.

CABINET COMMIrEE ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 40

(1974).
52. The proposed bill was circulated for comment to interested federal agencies and
departments and to other interested parties in May 1974 but was not formally introduced
in Congress. See Letter from Clay T. Whitehead, Director, Office of Telecommunications Policy, to United States Senate, April 18, 1973, on file at the Senate Committee on
Commerce, United States Senate.
53. Id.
54. OTP II § 104(c) (on file at OTP).
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agency." 5 5 Section 301 of OTP II provides that a cable licensing authority
"shall have exclusive authority under state law to execute and enforce the
provisions of Section 303 and adopt all other rules, regulations, and procedures . . . as are consistent with" the bill. Section 303 provides that the
"licensing authority shall . . . adopt procedures providing for the imposition

of sanctions" in the event of a violation of the terms of the license, grant
nonexclusive licenses, assure certain channel capacity, and so forth.
OTP II is designed to assure that there is only one nonfederal agency
which will perform all of the nonfederal functions enumerated in the bill.
The explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposed bill states that
"[t]itle III is intended to establish in a single non-Federal entity the
authority to regulate all aspects of cable system construction or operation
that are particular to such systems, except as otherwise specified in the
bill." 56 The memorandum explains that a section was added "to make clear
that the licensing authority has the power to impose sanctions for violations
of all terms of the license."' 57 Thus, OTP II would explicitly delineate which
functions are federal interests, and which are nonfederal, and allocate to
each governmental entity exclusive jurisdiction in its own sphere.
To the extent that the OTP bills purport to confer power on a nonfederal
agency, the proposals are unique. While there are numerous examples of
federal-nonfederal regulatory cooperation, they all rest upon the assumption
that the nonfederal partner performs acts within its state-conferred authority.
There are other examples of federal action which have nullified obstructionist or inconsistent state or local actions, but no precedent has been found in
which Congress has declared that there is a national interest in having
certain functions performed by a nonfederal agency with a concomitant
conferral of the powers appropriate to perform them. No such precedent has
been found because Congress has no constitutional authority to confer power
on any but a federal agency.
Il1.

THE FRANCHISE POWER

Before considering the scope of Congress' power to preempt, displace or
otherwise interfere with the exercise of state or local powers, it is useful to
consider what those powers are. The principal power exercised by local
55. Id. § 105(f).
56. Memorandum to William V. Skidmore from Henry Goldberg, General Counsel,
Office of Telecommunications Policy at 11, Jan. 10, 1975, on file in the Office of the
General Counsel, White House Office of Telecommunications Policy.
57. Id. at 11-12.
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governments over cable systems is the power to franchise. In addition,
regulatory power-an exercise of police power as distinguished from franchise power-is exercised where state cable commissions exist, but that
power in every case assumes the existence of, and builds upon, franchise
power. A franchise is the sine qua non for a lawful cable television
5
operation. 8

A franchise59 represents authority to occupy the public streets for a
publicly beneficial service not inconsistent with the public's use of the
streets. 60 Without the grant of the franchise, the encroachment upon or use
of the streets would amount to a trespass. 6 1 A franchise generally
has been defined as "a grant by or under the authority of government,
conferring a special and usually a permanent right to do an act or a series
of acts of public concern, and, when accepted, it becomes a contract and
is irrevocable, unless the right to revoke is expressly reserved. '62 In City
of Owensboro v. Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co.,63 the Supreme
Court held that a franchise conferred property rights in perpetuity since its
duration was not limited by the grant itself, nor by the general law of the
state, nor by the franchising authority's charter powers.
In England, and later in colonial America, the ownership of the public

thoroughfares, including navigable waters and roads, was held by the King in
58. The cases cited in this section are New York State and Supreme Court decisions.
The franchise law enunciated long ago by the New York Courts seems to comport with
the law in most other jurisdictions. One reason, of course, is that New York was a
financial and industrial leader at the turn of the century, and many of the disputes which
fostered the growth of franchise law occurred in New York before they occurred
elsewhere. In addition, the theories enunciated in the New York cases have been
explicitly or implicitly approved by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Russell v. Sebastian, 233
U.S. 195 (1914); City of Queensboro v. Cuimberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 230 U.S. 58
(1913).
Most franchise law in this country dates back to the early days of railroad, telephone,
and telegraph companies. Since little new law has evolved since the advent of cable
television, the cases cited here, although quite old, are nonetheless controlling.
59. The term franchise is used here to denote a "special franchise" or "secondary
franchise" as opposed to a "general franchise." A general franchise gives a corporation
its existence, the rights it derives from its incorporation; a special franchise confers the
right to use and occupy the public streets. See City of New York v. Comtel, Inc., 57
Misc. 2d 585, 594 n.3, 293 N.Y.S.2d 599, 607 n.3, (Sup. Ct.), a! 'd, 30 App. Div. 2d
1049, 294 N.Y.S.2d 981 (1968), aft'd on opinion of trial court, 25 N.Y.2d 922, 252
N.E.2d 285, 304 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1969).
60. See Milhau v. Sharp, 27 N.Y. 611 (1863).
61. Cf. City of New York v. Comtel, Inc., 57 Misc. 2d 585, 293 N.Y.S.2d 599 (Sup.
Ct.), a! 'd, 30 App. Div. 2d 1049, 294 N.Y.S.2d 981 (1968), aff'd on opinion of trial
court, 25 N.Y.2d 922, 252 N.E.2d 285, 304 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1969).
62. Trustees of Freeholders & Commonality v. Jessup, 162 N.Y. 122, 126, 56 N.E.
538, 539 (1900).
63. 230 U.S. 58 (1913).
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trust for the people. That sovereign power, which included the power to
authorize ferries and bridges across rivers, tolls upon roads and piers, and
wharves in navigable waters, evolved into the concept that states are trustees
for the people. The states through their legislatures exercised those powers
4
which had previously been exercised by the King.6
As a general rule, the present source of the franchise power rests in the
state."5 If the state has not delegated the power to its political subdivisions,
as it may constitutionally do in many states, the state legislature retains the
power.66 Usually, the only limitation upon the state's power to delegate
franchise power is in its constitution. In Wilcox v. McClellan,67 the New York
Court of Appeals found that the authority of the legislature to confer the
power upon local authorities was unrestricted with the exception of railroad
franchises to which certain conditions were imposed by the constitution.
Thus, the legislature could withdraw the power from one local council and
confer it upon another local body; alternatively, the legislature could retain
the power itself, since its authority to delegate or not is unrestrained.6 As a
result, the legislature can designate one franchising authority and "chang[e]
it from time to time as the public interest may require .

. ."69

The power

may be delegated conditionally by imposing requirements such as the
procedures which must be followed in granting a franchise and the restrictions which must be imposed upon the grantee.7 0 Thus, the franchise power
is inherent in the state because it is the sovereign, 7' and that power may not
72
be conferred by the federal government.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing. The power to award
64. See People ex rel. Howell v. Jessup, 160 N.Y. 249, 54 N.E. 682 (1899), in which
the court held that powers conferred by the king's representatives were undisturbed by
subsequent actions of the state.
65. See Russell v. Sebastian, 233 U.S. 195 (1914); City of Queensboro v. Cumberland
Tel. & Tel. Co., 230 U.S. 58, 65 (1913); People ex rel. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. v. State
Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 174 N.Y. 417, 435-36, 67 N.E. 69, 72 (1903).
66. See Holmes Elec. Protective Co. v. Williams, 288 N.Y. 407, 127 N.E. 315
(1920); City of New York v. Rice, 198 N.Y. 124, 91 N.E. 283 (1910); Village of
Carthage v. Central N.Y. Tel. & Tel. Co., 185 N.Y. 448, 78 N.E. 165 (1906); Ackerman
v. True, 175 N.Y. 353, 67 N.E. 629 (1903); Glee v. Northern Union Gas Co., 158 N.Y.
510, 53 N.E. 692 (1899).

67. 185 N.Y. 9, 77 N.E. 986 (1906).
68. Cf. Russell v. Sebastian, 233 U.S. 195, 202 (1914).
69. Wilcox v. McClellan, 185 N.Y. 9, 18, 77 N.E. 986, 987 (1906).
70. See, e.g., Boise Water Co. v. Boise City, 230 U.S. 84, 94 (1913).
71. Holmes Elec. Protective Co. v. Williams, 228 N.Y. 407, 420, 127 N.E. 315
(1920); Wilcox v. McClellan, 185 N.Y. 9, 16, 77 N.E. 986, 987 (1906).
72. See generally United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63, 68, 78 (1936); Geer v.
Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 533-34 (1896); People ex rel. Howell v. Jessup, 160 N.Y.
249, 257, 54 N.E. 682, 684 (1899).
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a cable television franchise, if not delegated by the state legislature to a
political subdivision, is held by the state. 73 When delegated to a political
subdivision, the power may be restricted by explicit directions as to both
what procedure should be followed in awarding it 74 and as to what terms
must be included in the franchise. The state may withdraw the power and
itself be the franchising authority, or it may withdraw it from one body and
designate a different local agency as the franchising authority. It may also
retain some power itself and delegate a portion to a local body (the
equivalent of a delegation with conditions). The state may also delegate the
power to some of its political subdivisions but retain the power with respect
to all other regions of the state. It is within the context of this sovereign state
power that the proposals which have been made for an explicitly cooperative
state-federal regulatory program must be viewed.
Although the Supreme Court's decisions which indicate that Congress
cannot interfere in the allocation of such state responsibility75 make the OTP
proposals immediately suspect, more recent examples of federal-state cooperative regulation may be regarded as precedent for the validity of the OTP
73. The FCC has adopted a policy which undermines this rule; the Commission
will award a certificate of compliance and thus authorize the carriage of broadcast
signals, despite the lack of any local franchise, in situations in which there is apparently
no authority to franchise. Reconsideration of Cable Television Report and Order, 36
F.C.C.2d 326, 366 (1972); Leacom, Inc., 50 F.C.C.2d 381 (1974). The foregoing
discussion demonstrates that there is always authority to franchise; thus the FCC policy
proceeds on a mistake of law. The Commission's policy arises out of a difficult dilemma:
when the state and its political subdivisions disclaim authority to franchise, yet indicate
their desire for (or at least their lack of objection to) a cable system in the community,
should the FCC withhold broadcast signal authority? Perhaps not. This is undoubtedly
why the policy was adopted. Yet the Commission's policy is founded upon a fiction. The
cases cited above indicate that whether the city attorney knows it or not, some state or
local body has franchise power; if it hasn't been delegated to the political subdivision, it
inheres in the state and may be exercised by the state legislature. Thus the Commission
is, in every such case, condoning an implicit violation of state law.
74. For example, Iowa's home rule provisions for municipalities requires a referendum. IowA CODE § 364.2(4) (1975). In New York City, the procedure spelled out by
the state specifies how many days notice there must be after publication of the terms of
the grant and the award thereof, describes the types of publications in which notice must
be given, provides a measure for compensation to the city by the grantee, and spells out
the maximum duration of the grant. NEW YORK CITY CHARTER, ch. 14. The same
conditions are not necessarily applicable to other political subdivisions in New York
State; the powers of other local governments are specified in city charters, and statutes of
general applicability. See People's Cable Corp. v. City of Rochester, 70 Misc. 2d 763,
334 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Sup. Ct. 1972), a! 'd, 41 App. Div. 2d 585, 340 N.Y.S.2d 883
(1973), in which the court invalidated a "license" which purported to confer franchise
rights that had not been awarded in accordance with the city charter's franchising
procedure.
75. See cases cited note 49 supra.
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proposals. But as the following examination demonstrates, none of these
cooperative regulatory programs is sufficiently analogous to cable television
to be of legal significance.
IV.

COOPERATIVE REGULATORY SCHEMES

In many areas of the law, the federal government has regulated in a
manner expressly designed to cooperate with state and local regulatory
efforts. Such cooperative regulatory programs have increased in number
during the past decade. Since cable proposals are intended to establish an
explicit cooperative relationship between the federal and nonfederal regulators, it is worthwhile to examine such programs in other areas to determine
whether any of them supplies a precedent or model for the cable proposal.
The FCC has already expressed the view that models are provided by the
Natural Gas Pipeline Act and the Federal Railroad Safety Act. 6 The other
possible precedents examined here are in the areas of food stamps, occupational health and safety, and clean air.
A.

The Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act

The Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 7 provides for the establishment and enforcement of safety standards for the transportations of gas via
interstate pipeline. The statute provides that after a two-year interim period
during which the Secretary of Transportation may adopt as the federal
standards any state standards in force on the effective date of the statute, the
Secretary shall adopt federal standards to apply to all interstate facilities. 78
State agencies are expressly permitted to adopt more stringent standards for
intrastate facilities which are compatible with the federal standards, but not
with regard to interstate facilities.7 9 The Act does not apply to pipeline
facilities
within a state when the safety standards and practices applicable
to same are regulated by a State agency (including a municipality)
which submits to the Secretary -an annual certification that such
State agency [has appropriate regulatory jurisdiction], has adopted
each Federal safety standard

. . .

established under this chapter as

of the date of -the certification; is enforcing each such standard;
and . . . has authority to require record maintenance, reporting
and inspection ....
80
76. See 1974 Notice and Inquiry.

77. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1671-84 (1970).
78. id.§ 1672(a)-(b).
79. Id.§ 1672(b).
80. id.§ 1674(a).
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Additionally, the state's law must provide for injunctive and monetary sanctions substantially as provided for in the Act. 8 ' Another section provides that
when such an annual certification is not received, "the Secretary is authorized
by agreement with a State agency (including a municipality) to authorize
such agency to assume responsibility for, and carry out on behalf of the
Secretary" specified record maintenance, inspection and monitoring functions.
In such cases, enforcement is entirely a matter for the federal authorities.82
The field of safety standards for interstate pipeline facilities is thus
preempted by the Act, while regulation of intrastate facilities is left to the
states, as it must be, if the intrastate activity does not affect an area of
interstate commerce which is regulated by Congress under the commerce
power.8 3 States or municipalities may regulate interstate facilities only if they
adopt the entire gamut of federal standards and have the power to enforce
them as Congress has directed that such standards be enforced. States
may also agree to keep records of and inspect interstate facilities on the
Secretary's behalf. And if a state chooses to take no regulatory action under
the Act, the federal authorities must do so.
If the Act is to serve as a model for federal-nonfederal cooperation in
regulating cable television, it is not the sort of cooperative regulatory
program that has been enunciated by either the FCC or OTP. The FCC has
always taken the position that certain matters, such as franchisee selection
and determination of franchise areas, should be left to the discretion of
nonfederal authorities for decision, not just for enforcement.8 4 0 TP envisions nonfederal authorities having jurisdiction to decide and enforce in a
large number of areas, exclusive of federal jurisdiction or review. 5 OTP and
the FCC agree that nonfederal action should not be a matter of state option
under which the federal authorities may step in where no state or local action
is taken.8 6
The Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act provides for total federal preemption, but permits (it does not mandate) nonfederal adoption and enforcement of standards arrived at and promulgated by federal authorities alone.
Thus, "the Federal government has invited the states to participate in the
8' 7
program by voluntarily undertaking the indispensable task of inspection.
81. id.
82. Id. § 1674(b).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1942).
84. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 207-09, reconsidered, 36
F.C.C.2d 326, 364-67 (1972); Clarification of Cable Television Report and Order, 46
F.C.C.2d 175, 190-93 (1974); Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 61 (1974).
85. See OTP Report ch., 3 at 25.
86. See generally id.; 1974 Notice and Inquiry 1206-07.
87. Tenneco, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 489 F.2d 334, 337 (4th Cir. 1973), cert.
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A state may not, however, disagree with even a single federal standard if it
wishes to have any regulatory role, since there is no decisional discretion
whatever at the nonfederal level. The Act is not a model for avoiding
duplicative regulation, since only one set of standards is contemplated. It
would appear, then, that this Act provides little precedential support for a
system of shared regulatory powers which has been proposed for cable
television.
B.

The FederalRailroad Safety Act

The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 19708 provides that the Secretary of
Transportation shall prescribe federal safety regulations for all areas of
railroad operations.8 9 The Act includes a saving clause permitting states to
adopt standards in addition to the federal safety standards:
A State may adopt or continue in force an additional or more
stringent law, rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety when necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially
local safety hazard, and when not incompatible with any Federal
law, rule, regulation, order, or standard, and when not creating
an undue burden on interstate commerce. 9 0
The statute also provides for state participation in carrying out investigative
and surveillance activities on an annual certification basis much like that
found in the National Gas Pipeline Safety Act, 91 But this portion of the
Railroad Safety Act fails to provide a precedent for sharing decisional
powers regarding cable television regulation.
The saving clause follows a declaration of policy that railroad safety
regulation "be nationally uniform to the extent practicable"9 2 and provides
for the continuation in effect of state regulations until a federal regulation
covering the same subject matter is adopted. The clause was interpeted in
Donelon v. New Orleans Terminal Co.,9a which held invalid standards
adopted by parish officials in Louisiana on the ground that the clause
permits only state action. The Court stated:
[W]e do not have before us an attempt by the State of Louisiana
to regulate safety; rather, we have before us individual officials
of a parish government ....
denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974). See also United Gas Pipeline Co. v. Terrebone Parish Police
Jury, 319 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. La. 1970), affd, 445 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1971).

88. 45 U.S.C. §§ 421-41 (1970).
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.§ 431(a).
Id.§ 434.
Id.§ 435.
Id.§ 434.

93. 474 F.2d 1108 (Sth Cir. 1973).
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that the State of Louisiana, acting through its Attorney General, could not bring this same common-law suit to enjoin unsafe railroad practices. Nor do we
intimate here that the Louisiana Legislature, or some duly delegated agency acting for the State, could not establish standards
We do not purport to suggest ...

under § 434's second exception . . . ; [We] hold only that these

individual officials are without authority under 'the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 to require the Railroad to meet -any
94
safety standard beyond those provided for in the national act.
Thus, Donelon eliminated the possibility of regulatory action initiated at the
local level, while leaving open the possibility of action by a duly delegated
agency of the state which might well be a local government.
The saving clause, as interpreted by Donelon, may provide some precedent
for cooperative regulation regarding cable television. One of the important
goals of the various cable television proposals is avoidance of duplicative regulation. The OTP bills seek to achieve this goal by providing that only one
nonfederal government may regulate in the areas designated to be nonfederal
functions. Since Donelon held that Congress may designate the states as its
nonfederal partners regarding railroad safety, presumably Congress could designate the states as its regulatory partners regarding cable television. Donelon
does not, however, stand for the proposition that Congress could designate
cities, towns, village and counties as 'its nonfederal partners, and it is widely
believed that these political subdivisions are the more appropriate loci of
95
nonfederal authority over cable systems.
The Federal Railroad Safety Act is also defective as a precedent in that it
leaves to a state the determination of whether it wishes to regulate regarding
local hazards. The "state option" feature of this and other cooperative
regulatory programs fatally flaws their applicability to cable television.
Under the Federal Railroad Safety Act, if a state opts not to regulate
regarding local hazards, 'these hazards will remain and the trains will
continue to run. In the regulation of cable television, however, short of an
assertion of preemptive federal licensing power, without nonfederal franchising action, the cable operator lacks authority to build and there will be no
cable television. And even if a preemptive federal licensing power were
asserted, the question becomes when such power would be exercised. Any
cable proposal which includes optional state or local action must necessarily
assume that, in the absence of state or local action, federal jurisdiction will
be fully sufficient to authorize the use of local streets, will legally take the
place of a franchise, and will confer sufficient authorization to construct the
94. Id. at 1112-13.
95. See FSLAC Report, supra note 23, at 11.
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system. There is considerable doubt that Congress has this power, 96 and
wholly apart from the legal infirmities of such a program, the political
difficulty of defining when federal licensing should preempt state and local
determination-or the lack thereof-argues strongly against such a proposal.
It is suggested, therefore, that the limited nature of the precedent afforded
by the Federal Railroad Safety Act, and the impracticality of any cooperative regulatory program that permits a state option, effectively eliminate it as
a model for cable regulation.
C. The Food Stamp Program
The Food Stamp Act of 196497 authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to
formulate and administer a food stamp program to be operated by state
agencies at their request.6 s Costs incurred by the state agencies are partially
reimbursed by the federal government. 99 The state agency must have
submitted by January 1, 1974, a plan of operation specifying the manner in
which the program will be implemented in every political subdivision of the
state, unless it was impossible or impractical to do so for any political
subdivision. 100

The Food Stamp Act appears to provide a twofold precedent for cable
television regulation. First, like the Federal Railroad Safety Act, it appears
to designate the states as the nonfederal partner in implementing the
program. 10 The analogy is limited, however, since it does not purport to
confer the jurisdiction to perform the actions contemplated by the Act, as
OTP would have Congress do in the area of cable television. All states may
lawfully operate welfare programs, such as the distribution of food stamps.
Thus, designation of the state alone as the nonfederal partner affords no

jurisdictionalprecedent.
Second, the statute commands participating states to provide a plan for
operating the program throughout the state (except when impossible or
96. There is considerable doubt about the authority of Congress to preempt franchising authority and to authorize the exercise of an equivalent power. Such action may well
interfere with the sovereign power of the state. Can Congress tell New York City that it
must permit its streets to be occupied by a cable system? See discussion of franchise
power pp. 883-85 supra.
97. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-25 (1974).
98. Id. § 2013(a).
99. id. § 2024.
100. Id. § 2019(e).
101. The statute refers to "State agency," 7 U.S.C. § 2013(a) (1970), "the state
agency of each State desiring to participate," id. § 2019(e) (emphasis added), but also
"participating political subdivisions," id. § 2019(d). Implementing regulations indicate
that the state agency that will operate the program must be designated by the governor
or state legislature. 7 C.F.R. § 250.5(a) (1974).
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impracticable). The translation of the statutory plan to cable would be a
program under which states would implement nonfederal franchising only
upon approval of federal authorities as to the manner in which the local
incidents of cable, those not preempted by the federal authorities, would be
handled. Failure to conform to the approved plan would result in a denial of
federal cooperation, which under the Food Stamp Act takes the form of
financial assistance' 0 2 and for cable television would be federal permission
to carry broadcast signals. This sort of program would eliminate the confusion that allegedly exists now as to the locus of franchising authority within
certain states. However, since states participate in the food stamp program
only on request, it is a state option program and its analogy to cable
television has the fundamental defect of being an optional program with
doubtful federal authority to act in cases in which the state declines the option.
D. The OccupationalSafety and Health Act
The Occupational Safety 'and Health Act of 1970i03 (OSHA), authorizes the Secretary of Labor to prescribe detailed standards to assure safe and
healthful working conditions for workers in businesses affecting interstate
commerce.'1 4 The statute permits states to assert jurisdiction over any
occupational safety or health issue with respect to which there is no federal
standard. 10 5 Thus, it does not "occupy the field." The Act further provides
that states may present to the Secretary a plan for assuming responsibility for
developing and enforcing standards governing matters that are the subject of
federal standards. 10 6 A state may choose to regulate regarding some hazards
and not others; as to any hazards which it decides not to regulate, federal
standards continue to 'apply. Moreover, in areas governed by federal standards for which a state assumes responsibility, the state standards may be
more stringent than the federal. One of the elements of the state plan must
be the provision for the development and enforcement of standards which
are "at least as effective in providing safe and healthful employment

. . .

as

,the standards promulgated under" the Act. 10 7 Upon approval of a state
plan, the Secretary's jurisdiction is considerably limited.' 08 If a state fails
102. Cf. Tucker v. Hardin, 430 F.2d 737 (1st Cir. 1970); Jay v. United States Dep't
of Agriculture, 441 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1971).
103. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970).
104. Id.§ 655(a).
105. Id. § 667(a).
106. Id. § 667(b)-(c).
107. Id. § 667(c)(2).
108. See id. § 667(e).
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substantially to comply with its plan, the Secretary may withdraw approval
of the plan, 100 but the withdrawal is subject to review in a United States
Court of Appeals. 110 Upon withdrawal, federal jurisdiction is reimposed. But
while the plan is in effect, the state substantially displaces federal authori-

ty. 111
OSHA's approach to state option programs is unique in its displacement of
federal jurisdiction. Similar programs provide that states may choose to
regulate regarding certain carefully specified subjects, with federal authority
over all other subjects remaining in force. OSHA, on the other hand, through
1 12
financial assistance for development and enforcement of state plans,
encourages states to assume full responsibility for implementing state-national objectives in the occupational safety and health field. If Congress could
articulate national objectives for cable television, their implementation could
be left to the states. To supplant in large measure the FCC's cable television
jurisdiction with state implementation of national objectives would likely
reduce the anti-competitive restrictions currently imposed on the cable
industry by the FCC. It could be argued that such a program ignores a need
for national uniformity in communications and the consequent desirability of
a central regulatory body to articulate and implement such uniformity, but
the same argument could have been made against OSHA by large manufacturers with nationwide operations. And while OSHA is not without its
detractors, the program has not failed because of its lack of uniformity. 1 3
Of course, the OSHA model is far from a perfect solution for cable
television. Because OSHA leaves to the states the option to act or not, its
analogy to cable would mean the option of franchising or not, which means
the states could ignore 'the federal program entirely if they so chose.
Moreover, it is unlikely that Congress would grant financial assistance for
nonfederal regulation of cable television, a factor which has probably figured
prominently in the positive state response to OSHA. However, its restriction
on federal regulation, and provision for a large role for the nonfederal
partner, is an idea that deserves far more attention in the discussion of ways
to resolve the problem of two or three levels of government regulating cable
109. Id. § 667(f).
110. Id.§ 667(g).
111. OSHA's legislative history indicates that the states would not be prevented from
taking over and administering their own programs once the state plan is approved. S.
REP. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1970). The Act, however, does not provide
for total displacement of federal authority, although it is substantial.
112. 29 U.S.C. § 672(g) (1970).
113. See Brown, State Plans Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,

38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 745 (1974) for a discussion of the pros and cons of OSHA's
state plan concept and a progress report on its implementation.

1975]

Cable Television's JurisdictionalDispute

television with diverse and conflicting objectives. OSHA suggests that incremental preemption by the federal government is not the only answer, and
indeed may be an entirely wrong approach to take.
E.

The Clean Air Act-1970 Amendments

The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 14 direct the Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency to promulgate national primary and
secondary ambient air quality standards, the implementation and enforcement of which is to be accomplished by the states pursuant to EPA-approved
plans. 115 Unlike the cooperative regulatory schemes, this Act appears to
mandate the submission of state plans by providing that
[e]ach State shall . . . adopt and submit to the Administrator,
within nine months after the promulgation of a national primary
ambient air quality standard ....a plan which provides for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of such primary standard in each air quality control region . . .within each State.",,
It might be argued that despite this mandatory language the statute leaves
states the option of not submitting a plan, since section 1857c-5(c) (1)
provides that the Administrator shall adopt a plan if the state fails to do so.
Although the legislative history appears to support this view, 117 the Supreme
Court has viewed the language as mandatory. In Train v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC),118 the Court reviewed the history of
federal-state cooperation in air pollution abatement efforts, beginning with a
1955 allocation of federal funds to conduct research and to provide technical
assistance to state and local governments, and reaching 1967 when Congress
reiterated that air pollution control was primarily a problem for state and
local governments, but one over which federal authorities were given wider
supervision and enforcement roles.
In 1970, Congress dramatically increased .the federal role in pollution
control by empowering the EPA Administrator to promulgate standards. The
1970 amendments, however, explicitly reserve for the states the primary
responsibility for assuring air quality within their geographical confines. The
NRDC Court reasoned that "[t]he difference under the Amendments was
that the States were no longer given any choice as to whether they would
meet this responsibility. For the first time they were required to attain air
114. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-58 (1970).
115. Id.§ 1857c-4, c-5.
116. Id.§ 1857(c)-5(a)(1) (emphasis added).
117. See 3 U.S. CODE CONG. &ADMrN. NEWS, 5356 (1970).
118. 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
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quality of specified standards, and to do so within a specified period of
time." 119 This statement appeared with no citation, no reasoning, and no
explanation of why it contradicts the long line of cases that hold Congress
may not confer power on states, may not allocate intrastate powers, and may
not issue commands to states.120 In view of the weight of authority to the
2
contrary, the statement must be viewed as inadvertent error.' '
Even assuming that the 1970 Clean Air Amendments, as interpreted in
NRDC, furnish some sort of precedent, a question arises as to the applicability of the precedent to cable television. The Clean Air Amendments require
the states to ensure compliance with federal standards. The objective was to
assure that air quality throughout the nation met specified minimum health
standards by a certain date. To that extent, the analogy holds for cable
television. Conceivably, Congress could decide that it was in the national
interest for cable systems to perform pursuant to federal standards and
guidelines and that such performance should be achieved within a fixed time
period. But because of the vastly different subject matter the analogy fails.
The failure of the states to meet their responsibility for assuring clean air
gave the matter some urgency, and was the reason for mandating state
action. It is hard to imagine that Congress or the Court could be convinced
that the meeting of certain objective criteria by cable systems within a
limited number of years assumes the same kind of urgency it attached to the
program which was to assure that air would not be harmful to health.
Nor has it been demonstrated that state and local governments, whose
failure to assure clean air lent urgency to that legislation and prompted the
mandating of state action, have failed to meet their responsibilities with
respect to cable television franchising and regulation. Thus the history of
state regulatory neglect that led to the 1970 enactment of the Clean Air
Amendments and their imposition of mandatory regulatory responsibilities
on the states cannot be analogized to cable television.
The Clean Air program certainly has not removed regulatory and jurisdictional uncertainties, and the amendments have spawned considerable litigation and case law dealing with variances from state plans. Before the
Supreme Court ruled on the Georgia plan in Train v. Natural Resources
119. Id. at 64-65.
120. See cases cited note 49 supra.
121. The doctrine of Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), that a
state can be tempted, but not coerced, into acting could not have been overturned so
cavalierly. See also Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1890), in which Mr.
Justice Taney, discussing the Constitution's extradition provision, which is phrased in

mandatory terms, states that "the Federal Government, under the Constitution, has no
power to impose on a state officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to
perform it. ." Id. at 107,
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Defense Council,122 the circuit courts of appeal were split three ways on
the issue of a state's authority to grant variances from its plan. 123 Analogous
legislation on cable television, intended to eliminate confusion, would more
likely have the unintended consequence of generating similar litigation and
result in endless regulatory uncertainty and complexity.
Yet the Clean Air Amendments furnish the only example that has been
found of congressional imposition of regulatory responsibility on a nonfederal
level of government. If the Clean Air Amendments are used as a model for
cable television regulation, Congress must decide -that the nonfederal responsibility is always the state's (a policy which has been opposed by the FCC,
OTP and FSLAC); that if a state doesn't submit an appropriate plan for
regulating cable television systems in accordance with stated national goals,
the federal government, presumably the FCC, will be empowered to do the
state's job (a matter of dubious legality); and that it is worth the expenditure
of considerably more resources than are currently expended by the FCC on
cable television regulation to review state plans, monitor their enforcement,
and step in when violations occur. Congress would probably not view
duplicative regulation of cable television as an issue whose resolution is
worth such fiscal and political commitments. Indeed, because of the considerable legal and regulatory complexities presently associated with cable
television, the effort should be to simplify cable regulation, not to complicate
it enormously by patterning legislation on the Clean Air Amendments.
What does the foregoing tell us about cooperative regulatory schemes? In
situations in which Congress may exercise commerce clause powers, it may
do more than it has traditionally done, such as to preempt a field and
regulate it by statute or delegate the regulatory authority to a federal agency.
Congress may decide that certain powers are best exercised by state or local
governments, and it may encourage nonfederal action by designating the
state as its nonfederal regulatory partner. It may encourage nonfederal
regulation by funding state agencies which propose a regulatory plan that
accords with the congressional objectives and receives federal approval. It
may encourage nonfederal regulatory initiatives by declaring that standards
more exacting than federal standards will be permitted.
In all of these cases, however, the state is not required by Congress to act.
The NRDC dictum to the contrary must be construed as error. 2 4 Congress
may say that if a state wishes to act it must act in a certain way or else the
122. 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
123. See also Note, 1970 Clean Air Amendments: Use and Abuse of the State
Implementation Plan, 26 BAYLOR L. REv. 232 (1974).
124. See note 121 & cases cited note 49 supra.
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federal authorities will act, but it may not confer on states the power to act in
-the manner in which states may confer power on their political subdivisions,
nor may it compel states to exercise their sovereign powers.
Finally, as possible analogies to cable television, the schemes that have
been examined fail to solve the perceived problem. First, they merely show
that Congress may designate the state, not a more local level of government,
as the nonfederal partner. Most of the serious comment on the "three-tier
problem" is to the effect that the more local the nonfederal partner the
better. Thus, the only available resolution to the problem contradicts widely
accepted policy recommendations as to the optimum regulatory structure.
In addition, each of the statutes examined provides that the federal power
shall apply in the event that a state decides either not to act at all, or not to
act in accordance with congressional determinations as to how the nonfederal
regulatory functions should be performed. This article has not examined
every aspect of the legality of a federal authority granting franchises, but the
analysis undertaken indicates that Congress, and in turn the FCC, may not
franchise. Even if the power may be preempted from the states and assumed
by the federal government, it is inconceivable from a practical standpoint
that the FCC could perform the entire job. There are thousands of communities left to be franchised. The FCC simply lacks the resources to conduct
franchise hearings in every community for which new franchise applications
are submitted, renewal hearings when existing franchises expire, revocation
hearings when serious violations occur, and hearings to determine whether
fines should be imposed in the event of less serious violations. Additionally,
Congress would be reluctant to appropriate the massive funds that would be
needed to execute those tasks.
Assuming that, for purely practical reasons, the FCC would not be given
fully preemptive franchise power, the question arises whether Congress might
adopt a cooperative regulatory program under which it would empower the
FCC ,to franchise when a state decides not -to act in accordance with congressional objectives. Again, it is doubtful that there is any federal franchising
authority. But even assuming that such authority exists, practical arguments,
as well as political ones, again suggest that such a proposal is unsound. The
difficulty of defining when a state's failure to act requires that a federal
authority should fill the void is not an insignificant obstacle.
Should the federal government act when the state invites it to, when the
state disclaims authority to franchise, when there is a dispute between the
state and a political subdivision (or between two political subdivisions, such
as a county government and a city located within the county) as to who has
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franchise power, or when a franchising authority refuses to grant or to renew
a new franchise? Should the federal authority enforce franchises when the
grantor refuses? Should the federal authority grant regional franchises even
though a portion of the region is already franchised? Should the federal
authority grant a new franchise when an existing locally awarded franchise is
lying fallow? Reasonable arguments can be made pro and con each of the
foregoing questions, indicating that there are few, if any, clear-cut cases in
which a state should be considered to have opted not to act so that the
federal authority should step in to fill the gap. Absent a clearly defined
policy on that issue (which would be virtually impossible to formulate), a
cooperative regulatory program like those examined should not be enacted
for cable television.
V.

CONCLUSION

The argument has been widely made that jurisdictional boundaries among
federal, state and local governments need to be more clearly drawn and that
cable's state and local regulators are burdening the industry. Thus, it has
been argued that Congress ought to draw the lines explicitly and enact
legislation establishing a cooperative regulatory program to assure that
nonfederal involvement in cable television will not be burdensome.
This proposed solution, however, is not the only answer. If in fact there is a
lack of clarity as to which level of government has authority to act in a given
situation and if states and localities have imposed burdensome regulation
upon cable systems, our legal system affords a remedy. Conflicting jurisdictional claims may be presented in court for an adjudication as to which
claimant is correct. If the FCC claims to have preempted an aspect of cable
regulation, and a franchising authority, disputing the FCC's authority to
preempt, imposes an obligation in conflict with the FCC rule, the cable
system may litigate the matter and have a court determine which government's regulation applies. Such disputes are constantly before the courts, and
as the preceding analysis demonstrates, there is no advantage in having
disputes about cable television regulation resolved by legislation rather than
by litigation.
Similarly, if state or local regulation of cable systems is burdensome, the
cable systems may challenge it as an unconstitutional obstruction of interstate
commerce. Such challenges are not new to the courts and may be brought by
cable systems just as they have been brought by other interstate entrepreneurs in the past. No problems have been articulated that cannot be resolved
within the existing legal system, and therefore no need has been shown for
legislation establishing a comprehensive program which delineates jurisdictional boundaries with precision.
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Two final observations must be made on the comprehensive, explicitly
cooperative regulatory programs, and their inapplicability to cable television.
First, in each case, the cooperative regulatory program was more than a
regulatory program. For food stamps, clean air and OSHA, the programs
were also, and perhaps primarily, funding devices for either feeding people,
channeling funds through the states to pollution sources or carrying out
federal inspection and enforcement objectives. Such additional objectives are
not present for cable television, and without them, the need to impose an
artificial and inflexible structure on regulatory relationships has not been
demonstrated.
Secondly, for each of the comprehensive programs, the objectives are
relatively simple and uncontroversial ones about which a political consensus
existed. There should be no quarrel with the objectives of feeding hungry
people, purifying the air or providing the nation's workers with a safe
working environment. No such consensus exists regarding cable television.
There is not a single objective for cable television around which a political
consensus could develop, and certainly nothing as uncontroversial as the
objective of feeding the hungry. It may well be that such comprehensive
programs, because of their all-inclusive nature, may be workable only in an
area about which there is such a consensus.
Cable television is a relatively new phenomenon. We are not yet in a
position to predict its rate of growth, what services cable systems ought to be
providing, whether cable systems ought to fill very different social needs in
urban as opposed to rural areas, or which attributes of monopoly ought to be
prevented and which permitted. Until some consensus emerges about questions such as these, cable television ought not be restrained by a static
structure allocating regulatory authority. Perhaps in five years, as some of
these questions start to be resolved, there will be very different regulatory
objectives for cable television. It would be a mistake to establish exclusive
spheres of regulatory interest now, particularly when any real grievances
about burdensome regulation and jurisdictional conflict may be resolved
without creating a static hierarchy of interests.

